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I. INTRODUCTION
The cause of action created by section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
now 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 broadly provides a remedy for persons deprived
1 The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute
of the District of Columbia.
Section 1983 traces its roots to the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, Ku Klux Klan
Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The act was passed in response to the oppression
of blacks in the years following the Civil War. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
173 (1961). For historical background and analysis of § 1983, see Michael G.
Collins, "Economic Rights," Implied Constitutional Actions and the Scope of Sec-
tion 1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493 (1989). A current broad overview of § 1983 is pre-
sented in William Hawkins, Note, Section 1983: A Basic Understanding, 12 AM
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 355 (1988).
Section 1983 has developed into a tort-like statute, relying extensively on well-
established principles of tort law. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978)
(Section 1983 "was intended to '[create] a species of tort liability' .... ,. (brackets
in original) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)); Charles F.
Abernathy, Section 1983 and Constitutional Torts, 77 GEO. L.J. 1441 (1989) (dis-
cussing the relationship between tort law and constitutional law in § 1983 ac-
tions); Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to
Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719 (1989) (analyzing the language of the Supreme Court in
addressing § 1983 litigation as shifting from constitutional to tort rhetoric).
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of constitutional rights by anyone acting under color of state law. The
statutory language does little beyond establishing this cause of action,
however, and federal courts have had the task of defining the parameters
and fleshing out the details. One aspect of § 1983, not directly addressed
by its wording or legislative history,2 is the damages recoverable under
the statute. In the "first generation" of § 1983 damage issue decisions,
the Supreme Court has provided significant guidance as to what types of
damages are available and has indicated in broad terms how they are to
be measured.' The Court, however, has not directly addressed some of
the finer points of damage computation in § 1983 actions, such as the
availability of prejudgment interest, contribution among joint tortfeasors,
and the application of the collateral source rule to damage determina-
tions.4 In particular, the Court has not clarified whether these "second
generation" damage details should be governed by state or federal law.5
"Second generation" damage issues which raise choice of law problems
are becoming increasingly important as states adopt damage policies that
are different from federal policies.6 One area where state policies may
now differ dramatically from federal policies due to recent "tort reform"
efforts is the collateral source rule. This rule is a principle of tort law
governing reduction of damage awards. The collateral source rule is ap-
plicable to § 1983 actions.7 There appears, however, to be some disagree-
ment among the federal courts, and between the majority of those courts
and state courts as to whether a federal common law collateral source
rule or state collateral source rules should apply to § 1983 damage de-
terminations.
This note examines the different approaches to the application of the
collateral source rule among federal and state courts entertaining § 1983
actions and the principles which should be applied by courts to resolve
the choice of law problem raised by the rule. The first section discusses
the common law collateral source rule and recent state legislative alter-
ations and abrogations of it. The second section explores current appli-
cations of the collateral source rule in federal and state courts entertain-
2 See Carey, 435 U.S. at 255 (noting that the Congress that enacted § 1983 did
not directly address the issue of damages, but that the general principles involved
in compensation must have been known to them). For further analysis of the
legislative history of§ 1983, see Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172-81; Monell v. Department
of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664-89 (1978); Steven H. Steinglass, Wrongful
Death Actions and Section 1983, 60 IND. L.J. 559, 645-54 (1985).
3 See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (addressing the availability of
punitive damages); Carey, 435 U.S. at 247 (establishing a broad definition of
compensatory damages and addressing the availability of nominal damages).
See generally STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE
COURTS, §§ 16.1-16.4 (1989) (Release #4 7/90) (reviewing damage policies in §
1983 actions in federal courts and the applicability of those policies to § 1983
litigation in state courts).
5 Id. § 16.3 at 16-6.
6 Id.
I See Perry v. Larson, 794 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the collateral
source rule applies to § 1983 litigation).
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ing § 1983 actions. The third section suggests principles which should
guide courts in their applications of the collateral source rule. This section
further focuses on the choice of law problem and the applicability of 42
U.S.C. § 1988 to resolve it.
II. THE COMMON LAW COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE AND RECENT
LEGISLATIVE ALTERATIONS
The collateral source rule applied in federal courts was derived from
the mid-nineteenth century common law of torts.8 Until recent state stat-
utory alterations of the rule, it was a well-established principle of the
tort law of every state.9 Under the collateral source rule, a prevailing
plaintiff's recovery is not reduced by the amount received by him from
gratuitous or pre-planned sources which are collateral to the defendant.' 0
Sources collateral to the defendant include insurance benefits, social se-
curity payments, disability benefits, workmen's compensation, welfare
payments, gratuitous benefits such as free medical care, and any other
third party compensation for plaintiff's injuries." For the rule to apply,
the source must truly be collateral.
The collateral source rule does not apply where the defendant or anyone
identified with the defendant, such as the defendant's insurer, has paid
for the plaintiffs benefit.12 While it is often a simple matter to determine
if a benefit is collateral, the distinction between benefits from sources
wholly independent of the tortfeasor and those identified with the tort-
feasor may be blurred at times. For instance, situations involving recov-
eries against the government can present this problem. Where one gov-
ernmental agency is found liable for plaintiff's injuries and another gov-
ernmental agency furnishes a benefit like social security or workmen's
compensation for that injury, it is more difficult to determine whether
the benefit is collateral since it is in some ways both independent of, and
identified with, the tortfeasor."
Courts have applied the collateral source rule both as a rule of law and
as a rule of evidence. 14 As a substantive rule of law, the collateral source
rule affects the size of a damage award by precluding reduction of the
award by plaintiffs collateral recovery. Its use as a procedural rule of
,,James L. Branton, The Collateral Source Rule, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 883, 883
& n.3 (1987). For an extensive historical analysis of the collateral source rule,
see John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478 (1966).9 Branton, supra note 8, at 883-84.
10 DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, § 8.10 581-82 (1973).
" Faye L. Ferguson, Note, Equal Protection Challenges to Legislative Abro-
gration of the Collateral Source Rule, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1303, 1308-09 &
n.15-17 (1987).
12 DOBBS, supra note 10, at 583.
13 Id.
11 Ferguson, supra note 11, at 1307-08; Branton, supra note 8, at 883.
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evidence flows logically from its substantive application. Since the plain-
tiff's damages may not be reduced by his collateral benefits, such benefits
are irrelevant to damage determinations and may not be presented to a
jury lest they prejudicially influence the jury's determination of damages.
Three primary justifications for the rule have been advanced by its
proponents. First, a tortfeasor should not be permitted to profit from the
injured party's collateral benefits, especially if the plaintiff has paid for
those benefits. For example, if the plaintiff has directly paid for insurance
coverage or has indirectly paid for bargained-for job benefits through a
reduced salary scale, the defendant should not get credit for the benefits
purchased by the plaintiff.'- To allow the defendant to do so would clearly
amount to a windfall for the defendant. The California Supreme Court
aptly explained this policy in Helfend v. Southern California Rapid
Transit District:
16
The collateral source rule expresses a policy judgment in favor
of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance for
personal injuries and for other eventualities. Courts consider
insurance a form of investment, the benefits of which become
payable without respect to other possible sources of funds. If
we were to permit a tortfeasor to mitigate damages with pay-
ments from plaintiff's insurance, plaintiff would be in a position
inferior to that of having bought no insurance, because his
payment of premiums would have earned no benefit. Defendant
should not be able to avoid payment of full compensation for
the injury inflicted merely because the victim has had the fore-
sight to provide himself with insurance.
17
Even in the case of benefits not paid for by the plaintiff the defendant
should not be permitted to have his liability reduced and receive, in
essence, a windfall. The policy issue is whether the tortfeasor or the
injured party should receive the windfall. The collateral source rule rep-
resents the common law's clear choice for the injured plaintiff over the
defendant with respect to who should benefit from third party contribution
to plaintiff's recovery. 18 Furthermore, in situations where the third party
insurer has rights of subrogation, 9 neither the plaintiff nor the defendent
will receive a windfall.
2 0
15 DOBBS, supra note 10, at 584 (also arguing against this justification based
on the proposition that the plaintiff paid only for security and not for the possi-
bility of a double recovery).
16 465 P.2d 61 (Cal. 1970).
17 Id. at 66-67.
18 See Fleming, supra note 8, at 1483; Branton, supra note 8, at 885 (quoting
Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1958)).
19 A party with a right of subrogation has "a right to step into the injured
party's shoes to the extent it has paid the loss." DOBBS, supra note 10, at 585.
Thus, a right of subrogation would allow the third party insurer to recover the
amount he paid to the plaintiff.
20 Id. at 585-86.
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A second justification for the collateral source rule is that legal com-
pensation is not truly adequate compensation. 21 Particularly in personal
injury cases, a plaintiff can never really be made whole. For example, it
is impossible to accurately judge for what amount, if any, a person would
be willing to lose a limb.22 In addition, since tort law generally does not
allow a plaintiff to recover attorney fees, the plaintiffs recovery is, in
reality, reduced by the costs of litigation.23 The collateral source rule
compensates for this reduction, thus allowing a more equitable result.
This justification is not applicable to § 1983 litigation, though, because
the prevailing plaintiffs are able to recover attorney fees as a result of
42 U.S.C. § 1988.24 A provision of § 1988 allows for recovery of attorney
fees for civil rights plaintiffs.
2
1
Deterrence, as a basic purpose of tort law, is the basis of the third
justification of the collateral source rule.26 A tortfeasor must pay in full
for his wrongful act to discourage both him and others from committing
similar tortious acts in the future. "[R]educing a plaintiffs recovery by
the sum of collateral payments would weaken the deterrent effect of
damage awards on tortious activity. ' 27 The collateral source rule helps to
ensure this deterrent effect.
Opponents of the collateral source rule raise a strong counterargument.
By conferring a windfall on the plaintiff, the rule overcompensates victims
and provides a double recovery.28 The primary purpose of tort law is to
compensate the victim for his injuries. A plaintiff who receives part of
his damages from the defendant and part from a third party is fully
compensated even though the defendant himself did not have to pay fully
for his tortious conduct. If the plaintiff is permitted to retain the full
damage award in addition to collateral benefits, he has been compensated
more than once for the same injury.29 Even where the third party con-
ferring the collateral benefit is permitted to recoup the amount of the
benefit through subrogation thus eliminating the double recovery, the
21 Fleming, supra note 8, at 1483.
22 Branton, supra note 8, at 885 (quoting Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344 (D.C.
Cir. 1954)).
23 DOBBS, supra note 10, at 584.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
28 The second sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 contains the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641. The Act provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985 and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs.
For discussion of the award of attorney's fees under this Act, see Mark D. Boveri,
Note, Surveying the Law of Fee Awards Under the Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1293 (1984).
26 Ferguson, supra note 11, at 1310 & n.21.
27Id. at 1310.
28 Branton, supra note 8 at 886.
29 See id. at 885-86; DOBBS, supra note 10, at 581.
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costs for the additional litigation involved in subrogation must be borne
by the litigants and the public.30
Another more recent argument against the collateral source rule is
that it has an inflationary effect on insurance premiums. 31 In most law-
suits today "a collectible judgment is insured against and it is the insurer,
not the individual defendant who pays. '13 2 The costs of the judgments borne
by the insurance companies are passed on to consumers in the form of
higher premiums; thus, larger damage awards result in higher insurance
rates. Theoretically, abolition of the collateral source rule will reduce
damage awards and correspondingly lower insurance rates.
The argument that the collateral source rule affects insurance rates
was the primary reason the rule came under attack during the wave of
tort reform in the 1970s.33 Due to concern about rapidly rising insurance
costs, legislatures in many states altered the collateral source rule in an
attempt to reduce damage awards in medical malpractice cases,34 "and
thus induce insurance companies to provide malpractice insurance at
lower prices. 3 5 A number of commentators have questioned the effect of
tort reform in general on the "insurance crisis,"3 6 but there is some evi-
dence that medical malpractice claim levels are rising at a lower rate
due to alterations of the collateral source rule.3 7
The more recent state legislative tort reform efforts during the last
decade involved a broader attack on the collateral source rule. While
earlier tort reform focused on the area of medical malpractice, 3 many of
the recent reforms apply to all types of tort actions, including claims
against the government. The reforms of the 1980's indicate a more general
30 See DOBBs, supra note 10, at 586. Dobbs argues that abrogation of both the
collateral source rule and subrogation rights would effect a savings to all con-
cerned parties. Although elimination of both would result in collateral sources
bearing the loss, the cost involved in shifting that loss from the collateral source
to the tortfeasor or his insurer would be saved. Subrogation actions would be
minimized or eliminated, thus avoiding both the costs involved in such suits and
any related administrative costs which would have been borne by the parties
involved.
-' Id. at 587.
32 Id.
3 Ferguson, supra note 11, at 1305. See also Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort
Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations
on Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628, 632 (1988).
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West 1990) (effective Sept. 24, 1975); IND.
CODE ANN. 16-9.5-2-2 (1990) (codified as amended by Acts 1976, P. L. 65, Sec. 4;
Acts 1977, P. L. 187, Sec. 9).
Ferguson, supra note 11, at 1305.
31 See, e.g., Branton, supra note 8, at 887; F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physicians'
Point of View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective on the
Symbolic Importance of "Tort Reform", 23 GA. L. REv. 295, 336-37 (1989).
37 Hubbard, supra note 36, at 336-37 & n. 167 (citing to Patricia M. Danzon,
The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, 49
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., 57 (1986)); Ferguson, supra note 12, at 1313 & n.31
(citing same).
31 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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concern for correcting problems in tort law.3 9 In particular, they address
the problems of overcompensating plaintiffs and creating subrogation
litigation brought about by the common law collateral source rule. The
collateral source rule has been legislatively altered or abolished in at
least thirty states as it applies to various civil causes of action including
medical malpractice, products liability and automobile cases. 40 Reform of
the collateral source rule varies among these states. Legislative ap-
proaches range from slight modification in a single type of civil action
4
'
to sweeping abrogation in many types of actions. 42 Some statutes elimi-
nate rights of subrogation, 43 while others retain them. 44 Most of these
alterations allow the plaintiff to retain any portion of the collateral benefit
that he has directly or indirectly paid for, but a few do not.
45
Although legislative alterations of the common law collateral source
rule differ greatly from state to state, 46 analysis of one state's statutory
revisions of the rule will provide a concrete basis of comparison to the
31 See generally Manzer, supra note 33 (discussing 1986 statutory tort reforms).
40 See ALA. CODE § 6-5-520 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.17.070, 09.55.548 (1990);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (1989); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West 1990); CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 985 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-111.6, -64-404 (1990);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-225(a) (1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (1989); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 627.7372, 766.202, 768.76 (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-34-3,
51-12-1 (Michie 1990); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 351-63, 431-10C-305, 663-10 (1990);
IDAHO CODE § 6-1606 (1990); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-2-2, 34-4-36-3 (1990); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3411, -3802, -3805 (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.39-020,
411.188 (Baldwin 1991); MD. INS. CODE ANN. § 540 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 231, § 60G (West 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.6303 (1990); MINN. STAT.
§§ 65B.51, 548.36 (1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507-C:7 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-6 (West 1990); N.Y. CiV. PRAc. L.
& R. 4545 (Consol. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.27, 2317.45, 2744.02
(Baldwin 1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 28.580, 278.215 (1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1301.602 (Purdon Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-34 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 21-3-12 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-119 (1990); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-14-4.5 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.080 (1990).
41 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-520 (1990) (collateral source rule modified only in
products liability cases); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4.5 (1990) (collateral source
rule abrogated solely in medical malpractice cases).
42 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 627.7372 (collateral source rule modified in automobile
cases), 766.202 (collateral source rule eliminated in medical malpractice cases),
768.76 (1989) (collateral source rule modified in negligence actions); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 13-21-111.6 (collateral source rule abrogated in all civil actions), 13-64-
402 (1990) (collateral source rule modified for medical claims).
4 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-225(c)
(1989); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231, § 60G (West 1990) (elimination of subrogation
rights except where federal rights of subrogation exist by law); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 1301.602 (Purdon Supp. 1990).
" See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308 (1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.580 (1989);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-4.5 (1990).
45 Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (1990) (requiring awards in civil
actions to be reduced only by collateral recovery which was not paid for under
contract by or on behalf of the plaintiff) with IDAHO CODE § 6-16-6 (1990) (elim-
inating the collateral source rule in any action for personal injury or property
damage regardless of plaintiff's payments towards the benefit).
16 See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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federal common law collateral source rule. In relation to § 1983, the initial
question raised when dealing with state statutory alterations of the col-
lateral source rule is whether the reform statutes apply to actions under
§ 1983.47
As an illustration of state legislative tort reform of the collateral source
rule, Ohio has passed several statutes addressing the rule. These statutes
reflect a desire to avoid overcompensating plaintiffs, to reduce litigation
costs by eliminating subrogation in some areas, and to save taxpayers'
money. The earliest of these statutes 8 altered the collateral source rule
with regard to medical claims, abolishing it for all collateral recovery
except where the benefits have been paid for by the plaintiff or his em-
ployer. This statute has been held to apply only to medical malpractice
actions.49 Another statute, dealing with recoveries against the state, pro-
vides for mandatory reduction of awards against the state of Ohio by all
collateral benefits received by the plaintiff.50 This statute is not applicable
to § 1983 actions because the state cannot be a defendant to a § 1983
action.5 ' A third statute, section 2744.05 of the Ohio Revised Code, ad-
dresses the collateral source rule in recoveries against political subdi-
visions.52 This statute requires a prevailing plaintiff to disclose all
collateral benefits to the court, which must then deduct them from the
damage award. In addition, the statute bars subrogation claims against
political subdivisions. While section 2744.05, standing alone, applies to
all civil rights litigation including § 1983 actions, 53 section 2744.09(E) of
the Ohio Revised Code54 specifically exempts "[clivil claims based upon
alleged violations of the constitution or statutes of the United States"55
from the entire chapter of the Ohio Revised Code which contains section
2744.05.
47 STEINGLASS, supra note 4, § 10.2, at 10-3.
41 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.27 (Baldwin 1990) (effective July 1, 1976). This
statute was enacted during the first wave of tort reform. See supra notes 33-37
and accompanying text.
49 Holman v. Grandview Hosp. & Medical Center, 524 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1987).
5" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(D) (Baldwin 1990).
5, The Supreme Court has held that a state is not a "person" within the meaning
of § 1983, and thus is not subject to liability under the statute. Will v. Michigan
Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) ("Neither a State nor its officials acting
in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." Id. at 66). See also 15 AM.
JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 17 (1976) (providing a general discussion of who may be
considered "persons" within the meaning of § 1983).
52 OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. § 2744.05 (Baldwin 1990).
The language of § 2744.05 draws no distinction as to types of litigation. In
addition, while a number of federal courts have held that various political sub-
divisions are not considered persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, some have held
otherwise. See 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 17 (1976). Municipalities, local
governmental units, and school boards have been held to be "persons" within the
meaning of § 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Thus, it appears that at least some political subdivisions may be reached under
§ 1983.
4 OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. § 2744.09(E) (Baldwin 1990).
55 Id.
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While the Ohio statutory provisions described thus far do not apply to
federal causes of action, Section 2317.45 of the Ohio Revised Code56 may
be applicable. Enacted in 1988, the statute deals in a detailed fashion
with the admission and utilization of evidence regarding collateral ben-
efits in tort litigation. It specifies both the nature of the evidence to be
admitted and the effect of that evidence on the calculation of damage
awards. Under section 2317.45(B)(1), a prevailing plaintiff must reveal
all relevant collateral benefits to the court.57 The court must then estab-
lish whether the plaintiff has already received or is reasonably certain
to receive the benefits within the next five years, and whether there are
any rights of recoupment involved. 5 Once the court is satisfied that the
benefits are or will be received by the plaintiff, and that there are no
rights of recoupment, the court then determines what portion of the col-
lateral benefit was paid for by the plaintiff or his employer.5 9 Finally, the
court is required to:
(i) Subtract from the compensatory damages that the plaintiff
otherwise would be awarded the amount of any disclosed col-
lateral benefits in relation to which both requirements of di-
vision (B)(2)(a) of this section are satisfied;
(ii) Subject to the limitation specified in this division, add to
the balance derived under division (B)(2)(c)(i) of this section
the total of any costs, premiums, and charges described in di-
vision (B)(2)(b) of this section. The amount of those costs, pre-
miums, and charges that is added to this balance shall not
exceed any amount subtracted pursuant to division (B)(2)(c)(i)
of this section from the compensatory damages that the plain-
tiff otherwise would be awarded.
6 0
SOHIo REVISED CODE ANN. § 2317.45 (Baldwin 1990).
17 Section 2317.45(B)(1) requires comprehensive disclosure of benefits:
Except as provided in division (C) of this section, if a plaintiff in a tort
action is entitled to an award of compensatory damages, that plaintiff shall
disclose to the court after such entitlement is determined all relevant col-
lateral benefits, all rights of recoupment relative to the disclosed collateral
benefits, and the costs, premiums, or charges for any of the disclosed col-
lateral benefits paid or contributed within the three-year period immedi-
ately preceding the accrual of the cause of action, by the plaintiff, any
member of his immediate family, or the employer of the plaintiff or any
member of his immediate family or, in a wrongful death action, the decedent,
any beneficiary of the action, the employer of the decedent or any beneficiary
of the action, any member of the immediate family of the decedent or any
such beneficiary, or the employer of any member of the immediate family
of the decedent or any such beneficiary.
Furthermore, collateral benefits are broadly defined in the statute to include such
items as social security, medicare, state disability and workmen's compensation,
private health insurance and accident insurance plans. OHIO REV CODE ANN.
§ 2317.45(A)(1)(a) (Baldwin 1990).
58 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.45(B)(2)(a) (Baldwin 1990).
59 § 2317.45(B)(2)(b).
60 § 2317.45(B)(2)(c).
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Thus, the damage award is ultimately reduced by the total amount of
the collateral benefits for which the plaintiff did not directly or indirectly
pay.
In determining whether section 2317.45 of the Ohio Revised Code is
applicable to § 1983 litigation, a number of details must be examined.
First, the definitions division of the Ohio statute provides that the col-
lateral sources in question must be related to "injury, death, or loss to
person or property that is a subject of a tort action.' '61 "Tort action" is
defined in the Ohio statute as "a civil action for damages for injury, death,
or loss to person or property ... but does not include civil action for
damages for a breach of contract or another agreement between per-
sons."62 Federal causes of action are not excluded by the language of this
section, and claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may certainly fall
under this definition of tort action. Section 2317.45 of the Ohio statute,
does contain a division excluding certain actions:
(c) This section does not apply as follows:
(1) In tort actions against the state in the court of claims or in
tort actions against political subdivisions of this state that are
commenced under or are subject to Chapter 2744 of the Revised
Code;
(2) To any medical claim, as defined in section 2305.11 of the
Revised Code.6 3
Again, the language contains no explicit exclusion of federal causes of
action from this particular division. Thus, it appears that the statute does
apply as a matter of state statutory interpretation, at least to actions
against individuals brought pursuant to § 1983. In addition, the statute
may also apply to § 1983 litigation against political subdivisions because
the exclusion in section 2317.45(C)(1) of the Ohio statute specifically refers
to actions governed by chapter 2744.64 Since federal causes of action are
explicitly outside the scope of chapter 2744,65 the exclusion in section
2317.45(C)(1) does not apply to them.66 Section 1983 actions brought
against political subdivisions may, therefore, be governed by the terms
of this statute.
61 § 2317.45(A)(1)(a).
62§ 2317.45(A)(1)(c).
§ 2317.45(C)(1)-(2).
- See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text for discussion of pertinent
sections of Chapter 2744.
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2744.09(E) (Baldwin 1990).
That the Ohio legislature truly intended to make § 2317.45 applicable to
federal causes of action is highly doubtful. Most state legislatures focusing on
state "tort reform" issues do not consider the possible application of their statutes
to federal causes of action such as § 1983. STEINGLASS, supra note 4, § 10.2, at
10-2, 10.6 (discussing Mellinger v. Town of West Springfield, 515 N.E.2d 584
(Mass. 1987), in which the court appeared to recognize that state legislatures do
not usually consider the effect of their legislation on federal causes of action). In
all probability, the Ohio legislature, by referring to Chapter 2744 in § 2317.45,
unintentionally included under § 2317.45 all the forms of action which were
explicitly excluded from Chapter 2744.
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The Ohio statute affecting the common law collateral source rule is not
especially unique in its applicability to federal causes of action; other
states have enacted statutes which would similarly apply. For example,
a Colorado statute which mandates reduction of damage awards in civil
actions by payments from collateral sources may be applicable to § 1983
litigation.6 7 Similarly, a Florida statute requiring its courts to offset dam-
age awards by various collateral source payments also appears to apply
to § 1983 cases.68 However, even if a state collateral source rule is ap-
plicable to § 1983 actions as a matter of state statutory construction, the
more basic issue of whether courts should look to state or federal law for
the appropriate collateral source rule must also be addressed.6 9
III. CURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE CASE LAW CONCERNING THE
COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE APPLIED TO SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
Courts are not entirely in agreement as to whether to use federal or
state law in applying the collateral source rule to § 1983 damage deter-
minations. A review of the limited case law in this area reveals that the
majority of the federal courts have chosen to apply federal common law. 70
Some federal courts, though, have utilized state law in their application
of the collateral source rule to § 1983 actions.71 In addition, at least one
state court entertaining a § 1983 action under concurrent jurisdiction has
looked to the law of its state for the appropriate collateral source rule. 72
A brief review of these cases clarifies both the nature and scope of the
choice of law problem with respect to the application of the collateral
source rule in § 1983 actions.
67 See COLO. REV. 6TAT. § 13-21-111.6 (1990) The Colorado statute applies to
all civil actions, which are defined as "any action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages ... resulting in death or injury to person or
property." Federal causes of action are not explicitly excluded. Thus, on its face,
§ 13-21-111.6 appears to apply to federal causes of action, including § 1983 liti-
gation.
6 See FLA. STAT. ch. 768.76 (1990). The Florida statute applies to any action
in the same part of the code. These actions are defined in FLA. STAT. ch. 768.71
(1990) as "any action for damages, whether in tort or contract." Like the Ohio
and Colorado statutes, this one also may apply to federal causes of action such
as § 1983. See also STEINGLASS, supra note 4, § 16.4(a), at 16-20 to 16-21.
619 Federal courts may be required to apply the federal common law collateral
source rule in § 1983 litigation. See infra notes 128 & 129 and accompanying
text. State courts entertaining § 1983 actions, however, may face a more com-
plicated decision regarding whether to follow state or federal law on the collateral
source rule. See STEINGLASS, supra note 4, § 10.1 - 10.6 (providing a list of questions
courts should ask in determining whether to apply state law and a detailed
analysis of those questions).
70 See infra, notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
71 See infra, notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
72 See Orr v. Crowder, 315 S.E.2d 593 (W. Va. 1983). See also infra notes 98-
100 and accompanying text.
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A. Courts Applying a Federal Common Law Collateral Source
Rule to Section 1983 Actions
Courts applying a federal form of the collateral source rule have taken
the view that relevant common law tort doctrines may apply to § 1983
litigation, and that "[flew rules are more firmly settled in the law of torts
than the inability of a tortfeasor to claim benefit for payments from a
collateral source."7 These cases have held that unemployment compen-
sation benefits and public assistance payments are collateral sources
which may not be used to offset damages.
The Seventh Circuit, in Perry v. Larson,7 4 applied the federal collateral
source rule to a § 1983 action. The prevailing plaintiff in Perry was a
deputy sheriff who had been wrongfully discharged for his political ac-
tivities. On appeal, the defendant requested that the damage award be
reduced by the amount of unemployment compensation the plaintiff re-
ceived following his discharge. The court expressly found the collateral
source rule to be applicable to § 1983. Looking to federal common law, 7
the court noted that "[t]he purpose of the collateral source rule is not to
prevent the plaintiff from being overcompensated, but rather to prevent
the tortfeasor from paying twice. ' 76 The court held that "[u]nemployment
compensation is a source of funds independent of the transaction giving
rise to the claim and thus is collateral. '77 Given the collateral nature of
the benefit, the court refused to deduct it from the damage award.7 8
In a recent decision by the Tenth Circuit, Starrett v. Wadley,7 9 the court
upheld the application of the federal collateral source rule as a rule of
evidence 0 in a § 1983 case involving sexual harassment of a county
employee by her supervisor. Having been found liable for violating the
71 Collins v. Robinson, 568 F. Supp. 1464 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd on other
grounds, 734 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1984).
74 794 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1986).
71 The court in Perry cited to Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1969),
and NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951), for the applicability of the
federal common law collateral source rule to § 1983 actions. Perry, 794 F.2d at
286. The court also cited Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir.
1984), vacated, 478 U.S. 1015 (1986), and Collins, 568 F. Supp. 1464 in support
of its finding that unemployment compensation benefits are collateral. Perry, 794
F.2d at 286.
11 Perry, 794 F.2d at 286 (quoting Thomas v. Shelton, 740 F.2d 478, 484 (7th
Cir. 1984)).
77 Id.
78 Accord Collins v. Robinson, 568 F. Supp. 1464 (E.D. Ark. 1983), affd on
other grounds 734 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing to Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S.
361, in support of the court's holding that unemployment compensation benefits
are collateral recovery in a § 1983 case); Gurmankin v. Marcase, 23 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 296 (E.D. Pa. 1978), afd in part and vacated in part, 629 F.2d
1115 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing to Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, and other federal
district court cases to support the court's finding that public assistance benefits
are collateral).
79 876 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1989).
80 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the county raised on
appeal the issue of whether the district court had erred in excluding the
plaintiff's unemployment compensation application as evidence to im-
peach plaintiff's testimony.8 ' At trial, the plaintiff had made a motion in
limine to preclude reference to her receipt of unemployment compensation
under the collateral source rule and the defendant had agreed to not
introduce such evidence.8 2 During trial, however, the defendant's counsel
attempted to introduce the unemployment compensation application to
indicate a discrepancy in plaintiff's testimony. 83 The district court held
that the application's "slight impeachment value was outweighed by the
danger of jury confusion.."84 Since allowing the evidence may have prej-
udiced the jury's damage determination by confusing them about the
existence of unemployment compensation, the court held that the trial
court was correct in excluding it. In reaching this decision, the appeals
court referred to federal case law, holding that unemployment compen-
sation is a collateral benefit, not to be offset against damage awards.85
B. Courts Applying State Collateral Source Rules to
Section 1983 Actions
Some federal and state courts entertaining § 1983 actions have looked
to state common law collateral source rules for application to § 1983 cases.
While state statutory alterations of the collateral source rule often differ
greatly from the federal common law rule,86 state common law collateral
source rules may or may not differ from the federal common law version.
Thus, it is possible for a court to look to state common law for a collateral
source rule and still produce the same result as a court which has applied
the federal form of the rule.
The plain fact that a court is applying state law to resolve this damage
issue, however, could be problematic. If a particular state's common law
collateral source rule has developed differently from the federal common
law rule, a court applying that state rule may often produce a result
different from that reached by a court looking to the federal common law
collateral source rule. Furthermore, if a court has chosen to utilize state
common law in this area, and that common law is later legislatively
altered through the tort reform movement, the court may continue to
apply state law in its altered statutory form. Thus the dilemma presented
81 Starrett, 876 F.2d at 811-12.
Id. at 823.
3Id.
84Id.
83The court in Starrett cited to E.E.O.C. v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (10th
Cir. 1980), for the proposition that unemployment compensation benefits are
collateral. Starrett, 876 F.2d at 823.
See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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is that the application of state collateral source rules, whether statutory
or common law, may produce results which differ dramatically from fed-
eral common law.
8 7
An example of a court applying a state collateral source rule which
produced a result different from that which would be reached by appli-
cation of the federal rule is found in Carswell v. Bay County. 8 In Carswell,
the Eleventh Circuit upheld a district court's application of Florida's
common law collateral source rule to reduce a § 1983 damage award
allowing for medical expenses against a county jail administrator for
deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs medical needs. 9 Under a settle-
ment agreement with the county, the plaintiff was not required to repay
the county for the medical expenses involved when he was finally treated.
Noting that Florida's common law version of the collateral source rule
only applies when the benefits are somehow earned in order to prevent
a windfall to the plaintiff,90 the court held that this limitation on Florida's
rule precluded the plaintiff from recovering for medical expenses under
his § 1983 claim.91 Since the stipulation that the benefit be earned by the
87 Seemingly minor variations in the different forms of the collateral source
rule can significantly alter the amount of damage awards by allowing awards to
be reduced by the amount of collateral recovery, whether in part or in whole. For
example, in Mays v. United States, 806 F.2d 976 (10th Cir. 1986), the court noted
a split of authority on whether Civilian Health and Medical Program of the
Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) benefits are a collateral source to a Federal
Tort Claims Act award. The court held that under the Colorado common law
collateral source rule, CHAMPUS benefits were not collateral. Id. at 977-78. The
benefits that were deducted from the award totalled $195,055. Id. at 977. See
infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text for a variation of the collateral source
rule applied to a § 1983 damage determination that resulted in an award reduction
which would not have occurred under the federal common law collateral source
rule.
88 854 F.2d 454 (llth Cir. 1988).
89 Id. at 458-59.
90 The trial court in Carswell cited to Florida Physician's Ins. Reciprocal v.
Stanley, 452 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1984), and Winston Towers 100 Ass'n v. De Carlo,
481 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), in support of its definition of Florida's
collateral source rule. CarsweU, 854 F.2d at 458. The plaintiff did not argue that
a federal collateral source rule should apply. He instead argued that under Flor-
ida's collateral source rule, there should be no set off against his recovery on the
§ 1983 claim for his collateral compensation from the hospital. Had the plaintiff
argued for and succeeded in convincing the appeals court that the correct collateral
source rule to apply was the federal common law version, there may have been
no set off. An additional twist to the damage determination aspect of Carswell,
however, is that the medical payments by the hospital could possibly be viewed
as a settlement by a joint tortfeasor rather than a collateral benefit. If the Eleventh
Circuit had approached the award in this manner, the collateral source rule
analysis would not apply. See Carswell, 854 F.2d at 458 n.4. Courts have held
that "the collateral source rule, which applies to gratuitous or pre-planned benefits
such as insurance and sick pay, could not be tortured to encompass settlements
made in contemplation of litigation, even when made by a defendant later found
not liable to the plaintiff." Johnson v. Rogers, 621 F.2d 300, 303 n.5 (8th Cir.
1980) (citing Snowden v. D.C. Transit System, 454 F.2d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
91 Carswell, 854 F.2d at 458-59.
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plaintiff is not a part of the federal common law collateral source rule,92
the opposite result would have been reached if the court had applied the
federal rule.
Other courts have applied state common law collateral source rules
which have produced results similar to that which would be expected
under application of the federal rule. For example, in Barberic v. City of
Hawthorne,3 the United States District Court for the Central District of
California applied California common law to the damage determination
in a § 1983 case involving the violation of a police woman's constitutional
rights when she was involuntarily retired due to a psychological disa-
bility. The court reduced the plaintiff's award of lost wages by the amount
of the benefits she had received through the California Public Employees
Retirement System.94 The court looked to the California common law
collateral source rule95 to determine that these benefits were identified
with the defendant 96 and, as such, fell outside of California's collateral
source rule. The view that sources identified with the defendant are not
collateral is also a part of the federal common law collateral source rule,
97
but it is not entirely clear from the details of this case if the retirement
benefits at issue would be considered identified with the defendant under
the federal rule.
State courts have also looked to their own state collateral source rules
in § 1983 litigation. In Orr v. Crowder,9 a § 1983 suit brought in a West
Virginia state court for the discharge of a teacher in violation of his First
Amendment rights, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia looked
to West Virginia common law9 to uphold the trial court's application of
the collateral source rule to the plaintiff's damage award. The court held
that, according to West Virginia law, unemployment compensation ben-
efits received by the plaintiff were collateral and could not be used to
reduce the damage award. 100 The result in Orr is the same as that which
would be reached under the federal version of the collateral source rule.
Although the courts in the above three cases were applying state com-
mon law collateral source rules to their damage determinations, only the
common law version in Florida was clearly different from the federal
92 See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
91669 F. Supp. 985 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
4 Id. at 995.
15 The court in Barberic cited Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist.,
465 P.2d 61 (Cal. 1970), and CAL. GoVT CODE §§ 20740-20760 (1986) (describing
the funding for the California Public Employees Retirement System) in support
of its determination that the California collateral source rule did not apply to the
benefits received by the plaintiff. Barberic, 669 F. Supp. at 995.
96 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
9, Id.
98 315 S.E.2d 593 (W. Va. 1984).
9The court in Orr cited to Ratlief v. Yokum, 280 S.E.2d 584 (W. Va. 1981),
and to Jones v. Laird Found., Inc., 195 S.E.2d 821 (W. Va. 1973), for an explanation
of West Virginia's collateral source rule. Orr, 315 S.E.2d at 609-10. All aspects
of the collateral source rule discussed in Ratlief and Jones appear to coincide with
the federal common law rule.
100 Orr, 315 S.E.2d at 610.
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common law collateral source rule, and thus produced a result at variance
with that which would have been produced by use of the federal common
law rule. There is not a great deal of case law available concerning the
collateral source rule in § 1983 litigation and virtually none applying
state statutory forms of the rule. To some degree, the lack of case law is
due to the fact that state statutory alterations of the collateral source
rule were enacted only recently. In addition, "second generation" damage
issues are not encountered with great frequency in § 1983 litigation be-
cause they do not arise until the tail end of a lawsuit as part of, or following
the determination of the damage award, providing, of course, that the
plaintiff has prevailed. Though limited in frequency of appearance, "sec-
ond generation" damage issues, such as the collateral source rule, can
have significant effects on damage awards.10 1 At present, there is no
binding precedent to prevent application of state rules, which leaves open
the possibility that differing damage computations under § 1983 may
result through application of state statutory alterations of the collateral
source rule.
IV. CHOICE OF LAW REGARDING THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IN
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION
The question of damages in general, including the collateral source
rule, is not specifically addressed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since the statute
is silent concerning the collateral source rule, federal courts must choose
whether to follow the law of the forum state or to create independent
federal doctrine to govern this area. Given the great differences between
the common law collateral source rule and state statutory constructions
of it,102 the choice of law issue here is a significant one. If courts may look
to state law for the appropriate form of the collateral source rule to apply
to § 1983 cases, the amount of damages awarded to prevailing plaintiffs
will vary depending on the location of the court in which the suit is
brought. Even if federal courts are required to apply a federal common
law collateral source rule to § 1983 actions, it is not clear whether state
courts would be required to apply the federal version. 10 3 Another question
which must be addressed is whether there is a sufficient body of federal
law concerning the collateral source rule as applied to § 1983 and other
civil rights actions which may be utilized as a federal collateral source
rule in all § 1983 litigation.
101 See supra note 87.
102 See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
.0. See generally STEINGLASS, supra note 4 (raising the issue of whether state
courts must apply federal rules in the area of damages); Susan N. Herman, Beyond
Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1057, 1060-63 (1989)
(providing a more general discussion of the choice of law problem in state courts
entertaining § 1983 actions).
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A. The Applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to Resolve the Choice
of Law Problem Regarding the Collateral Source Rule
Congress attempted to provide guidance regarding choice of law for
civil rights actions by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1988,104 and courts have ap-
plied § 1988 to actions brought under § 1983.105 Section 1988, on its face,
appears to require federal courts to look to state law on issues where the
federal law is deficient. However, the language of the statute is not at
all clear regarding such items as which source of federal law - present
statutory, common, or other - is intended to be examined for deficiencies;
what the term deficient means; or even what "common law" should be
employed to fill in the gaps.1 06 As one commentator aptly stated, "[t]he
few commentaries on this provision demonstrate conclusively that no one
knows what it means. The language is baroque, and the legislative history
of little help.' 0 7
Supreme Court interpretation of § 1988 has not been entirely clear or
consistent. The Court initially provided a broad approach to choice of law
in civil rights actions. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,'0 8 the Court
o The choice of law provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) provides:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts
by the provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title
"CRIMES," for the protection of all persons in the United States in their
civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in
conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are
suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not
adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish
suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein
the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal case is held, so far as
the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United
States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and
disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction
of punishment on the party found guilty.
,0- The applicability of § 1988 to § 1983 litigation is founded on the historical
link between the two statutes. Section 1988, derived from the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, was enacted first. The Civil
Rights Act of 1871 (section 1 of which is now § 1983) was part of a group of
Reconstruction Statutes enacted between 1866 and 1875, and as such, "incorpo-
rated by reference the procedures adopted by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to
govern federal civil rights actions." Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil
Rights Actions: Some Old Light on Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 601, 613
(1985). For a detailed historical derivation of § 1988, see Theodore Eisenberg,
State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The Proper Scope of Section 1988, 128
U. PA. L. REV. 499 (1980).
106 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 105 (thoroughly analyzing and criticizing
§ 1988, and proposing that it not be applied to § 1983 actions); Kreimer, supra
note 105, at 615 (footnote omitted) (noting that Section 1988's "tortious syntax,
read in light of its opaque legislative history, leaves substantial room for inter-
pretation.").
107 Herman, supra note 103, at 1077.
108 396 U.S. 229 (1969). Sullivan was brought in a state court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1988).
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gave an interpretation of § 1988 which permitted courts to look to both
state and federal law for the most appropriate rules:
This means, as we read § 1988, that both federal and state
rules on damages may be utilized, whichever better serves the
policies expressed in the federal statutes .... The rule of dam-
ages, whether drawn from federal or state sources, is a federal
rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right is im-
paired.10 9
Later, however, the Supreme Court identified a narrower, three-step ap-
proach to resolving the choice of law issue in civil rights actions in Burnett
v. Grattan."0 The Fifth Circuit, which has utilized this three-part analysis
extensively, succinctly summarized the approach in a recent § 1983 case:
This statutory scheme establishes a three part test for finding
substantive law. First, if federal law is neither deficient nor
inapplicable, it will apply. Second, if federal law does not apply,
state law does apply, unless, third, state law would be incon-
sistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United
States."'
Despite the Supreme Court's identification of this deceptively simple
analysis,'12 which could be applied to all remaining § 1983 choice of law
issues, the Court has only applied § 1988 analysis in a few, limited areas
governing issues such as survival of civil rights actions 13 and statutes
of limitations. 1 4 It has not applied the § 1988 choice of law language to
its decisions on damage issues." 5 The Supreme Court has not clearly
articulated why it has chosen to apply § 1988 in only limited circum-
stances, or even whether § 1988 compels the use of state law in those
109 Id. at 240.
110 468 U.S. 42 (1984) (brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981). The three-step process
is described by the Supreme Court in Burnett as follows:
First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States "so far as such
laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civils rights statutes] into
effect." Ibid. If no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the second
step by considering application of state "common law as modified and
changed by the constitution and statutes" of the forum State. Ibid. A third
step asserts the predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply
state law only if it is not "inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws
of the United States." Ibid.
Id. at 47-48 (quoting portions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988) (brackets in original).
" Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1983).
112 At first glance, the three-step process identified by the Supreme Court ap-
pears to be easy and mechanical in application. The confusion as to the language
of § 1988, however, makes application very difficult since courts must first in-
terpret the meaning of the statute. See supra notes 106-107 and accompanying
text. Scholars do not agree on a single interpretation of the Supreme Court's
application of § 1988 and hold widely divergent views on how § 1988 should be
applied. See infra note 117.
13 Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
114 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984).
115 See Steinglass, supra note 2, at 618 (noting that the Supreme Court "has
all but ignored § 1988 and the law of the forum state in its damage cases.").
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limited instances in which the Court has applied it.116 This lack of clarity
as to choice of law rules has lead to scholars describing the Supreme
Court's approach as ad hoc."17 As one recent commentator stated, "[there
is no developed body of law governing choice of law in § 1983 cases, just
a hodgepodge of different approaches."'I s
Other commentators have attempted to identify a pattern in the Su-
preme Court's use of § 1988. Some view the Court's application of § 1988
as an indication that the Court is drawing a distinction between sub-
stantive matters and procedural rules involved in § 1983 litigation."1
Under this analysis, the Supreme Court is viewed as saying that courts
may apply § 1988 and look to state law regarding procedures to be applied,
but that they may not do so regarding the substance of § 1983.120 It is
not always clear, however, whether a rule is procedural or substantive.
12 1
For example, statutes of limitations and survival actions may be consid-
ered substantive,'12  yet under this analysis, they must be viewed as pro-
cedural. Problems with semantics aside, this view does make some sense
in the context of § 1983. Statutes of limitations are uniquely legislative
in nature,"2 and when they are not included as part of a statute, they do
not directly affect substantive rights granted by the statute.124 Similarly,
survival of a cause of action is not integrally related to the substance of
that action. It does nothing to further the definition of the cause of action
and does not create a new cause of action.12 ' Thus, statutes of limitations
and survival actions may be considered procedural in the sense that they
are more closely related to the functioning of the judicial process than to
116 Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to § 1983 with Special Attention to
Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 58 (1989).
"I Id. at 54, 60 (noting this description of the Supreme Court's approach to
§ 1988 and citing to Jennifer A. Coleman, 42 U.S.C. Section 1988: A Congres-
sionally-Mandated Approach to the Construction of Section 1983, 19 IND. L. REV.
665 (1986)). Many scholars are critical of the Supreme Court's confusing approach
to § 1988. They offer a wide range of views regarding what § 1988 means and
how it should be applied. Compare, e.g., Eisenburg, supra note 105 (proposing that
§ 1988 be applied only in cases which are brought under state law in a state court
and then removed to federal court) with Kreimer, supra note 105 (arguing that
the reference in § 1988 to common law should be interpreted as meaning some
sort of general common law as opposed to any particular state's common law.
Thus, when federal law is deficient, courts may fill the gap by creating federal
common law). For a brief review of the scholarly debate and analysis of the views
held by several commentators, see Beermann, supra note 116, at 59-65.
1'Beermann, supra note 116, at 75.
"'See, e.g., Herman, supra note 103, at 1080 n.102.
120Id.
121 Id. "[L]ong experience in diversity cases and in other areas of concurrent
jurisdiction teaches that this distinction is more of a restatement of the problem
than a resolution of it." Id.
12 See 51 AM. JuR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 21 (1970) (attempting to distin-
guish when statutes of limitations are substantive and when they are procedural).
,23 Id. at § 9.
1241d. at § 21.
125 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 556 (1962).
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the definition of statutory rights. Perhaps a better way of describing the
Supreme Court's approach is that "the Court has generally developed
uniform federal policies on issues that go to the substance of the § 1983
cause of action and that affect the underlying conduct § 1983 was intended
to control," but has used § 1988 to allow resort to state law for issues
that are not integrally related to the substance of § 1983 or to the un-
derlying conduct.126 While neither of these descriptions can fully account
for the Supreme Court's application of § 1988 to § 1983 litigation, they
do provide some framework for analysis.
27
Unlike statutes of limitations and survival issues, damages are directly
related to substantive rights. They are closely tied to the substance of §
1983 in that they define the nature and scope of one type of available
remedy. A right would have little value without an appropriate remedy
for its violation. Damages also provide a deterrent influence on the un-
derlying conduct proscribed by § 1983.128 Viewed in this way, damages
are more like immunities than statutes of limitations. Immunities relate
to the extent of the right; they define who can be reached under the
statute. Under § 1983, immunities are treated as an integral part of the
statute and are dealt with under federal common law.129 Similarly, dam-
ages in general are considered as part of the substantive portion of § 1983.
The collateral source rule, whether applied directly as a rule of law or
indirectly as a procedural rule of evidence, ultimately affects the sub-
stantive determination of damages. Therefore, under this view of the
Supreme Court's application of § 1988, federal common law should govern
the application of the collateral source rule in § 1983 litigation.
Another possible way of viewing the Supreme Court's approach to
§ 1988 is that the federal policy behind the approach is one of convenience,
with manageability the key concern. It makes sense to apply state statutes
of limitations to § 1983 litigation since a federal one does not exist in the
context of § 1983.130 Application of state survival policies to § 1983 claims
may allow the federal remedy to be applied"' where it would otherwise
126 Steinglass, supra note 2, at 618.
127 These views of the Supreme Court's application of § 1988 to § 1983 litigation
are consistent with the Supreme Court's determination in Felder v. Casey, 487
U.S. 131 (1988). The Court in Felder held that a state notice-of-claim statute is
not applicable to a § 1983 action brought in state court. Id. at 134. Notice-of-
claim statutes are procedural; they do not go to the substance or affect the un-
derlying behavior addressed by § 1983. See supra note 126 and accompanying
text. Further, there is no federal notice-of-claim provision applicable to § 1983
actions. The Supreme Court in Felder, however, held that the mere absence of a
federal notice-of-claim provision was not a deficiency and that the issue, therefore,
was one of preemption. Id. at 138. Thus, the Court did not find it necessary to
apply the § 1988 three-part test. In so holding, the Supreme Court provided further
guidance as to when § 1988 does and does not apply to civil rights litigation.
128 See Steinglass, supra note 2, at 618.
129 Id.
130 See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
131 See Peter M. Van Zante, Note, Choice of Law under Section 1983, 37 U. CHI.
L. REV. 494, 505 (1970).
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abate due to lack of federal law to govern it in § 1983 actions. 132 With
regard to damages, however, the aspect of convenience is reversed. It may
be easier, at least for appellate courts dealing with federal rights under
§ 1983, to apply an already-established uniform federal common law of
damages rather than juggle the application of widely diverse state dam-
age laws. The diversity and flux in state damage laws is evident in the
recent statutory modification of the collateral source rule. Since damage
policies differ greatly from state to state, application of state damage laws
would make the value of the substantive right afforded by § 1983 vary
according to the laws of the state in which the suit is brought. The Su-
preme Court appears to be attempting to avoid this result.
In a line of cases involving damage issues under § 1988,133 the Supreme
Court consistently refused to use a § 1988 analysis to determine the choice
of law. The Court did not look to the laws of the forum state, but instead
applied the "principles derived from the common law of torts"134 to resolve
the damage issues. Commentators and courts have interpreted the Su-
preme Court's apparent unwillingness to apply § 1988 choice of law lan-
guage to § 1983 actions as an indication that, while resort to state law
is acceptable to resolve some procedural issues even though inconsist-
encies result therefrom, 13 the Supreme Court is strongly concerned with
112 A federal survival policy was applied in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
Carlson was a Bivens action, a judicially-created counterpart to § 1983 directed
at defendants acting under color of federal law who have violated a plaintiffs
constitutional rights. In spite of the obviously analogous nature of the suit in
Carlson to a § 1983 action, there has been no indication by the Supreme Court
that the federal survival policy utilized in Carlson may be applicable to § 1983
litigation.
13 See Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986)
(permissible elements of compensatory damages); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30
(1983) (punitive damages); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (compensatory
damages).
114 Stachura, 477 U.S. at 158.
131 See Herman, supra note 103, 1082-83 (noting that state statutes of limi-
tations, tolling statutes, survivorship statutes and collateral estoppel rules are
borrowed by federal courts in § 1983 actions and that "[n]ationwide uniformity
of procedure in section 1983 is not an overriding value"). While interstate uni-
formity as to procedural rules may not be of major importance to the Supreme
Court, intrastate uniformity in procedures appears to be highly valued. For ex-
ample, in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), the Supreme Court limited the
use of state law relating to statutes of limitations in § 1983 actions to determi-
nation of the length of the limitations period and issues related to tolling and
application. The Court held that federal law governs the characterization of
§ 1983 actions, and that for statute of limitations purposes § 1983 should be
uniformly characterized as a personal injury action. Id. at 280. Both federal and
state courts are to look only to the appropriate personal injury statute of limi-
tations in each state for application to § 1983 litigation. Thus, while the statute
of limitations will vary somewhat from state to state, intrastate uniformity is
achieved in relation to statutes of limitations. See also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S.
131 (1988) (holding that a state notice-of-claim statute does not apply to § 1983
litigation partly because "its enforcement in state-court actions will frequently
and predictably produce different outcomes in section 1983 litigation based solely
on whether the claim is asserted in state or federal court" Id. at 131).
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nationwide uniformity in the substantive aspects of § 1983, such as the
area of damages. 36 This same concern for uniformity in the substance of
the Civil Rights Acts was succinctly stated by the Third Circuit over two
decades ago in Basista v. Weir.1
7
We believe that the benefits of the Acts were intended to be
uniform throughout the United States, that the protection to
the individual to be afforded by them was not intended by
Congress to differ from state to state, and that the amount of
damages to be recovered by the injured individual was not to
vary because of the law of the state in which the federal court
suit was brought. Federal common law must be applied to effect
uniformity, otherwise the Civil Rights Acts would fail to effect
the purposes and ends which Congress intended.13
Recent § 1983 cases carry on this theme of uniformity and emphasize
the exhaustion of all potentially applicable federal law prior to turning
to state law under § 1988. 39 For example, the Eleventh Circuit in Gilmere
v. City of Atlanta'40 held that a federal rule of damages applied to remedy
injuries suffered by a decedent which resulted from a deprivation of the
decedent's constitutional rights. The court expresses a concern for uni-
formity in its reasoning:
[Aipplying a federal standard of damages for injuries suffered
by a decedent will promote consistency in the type and amount
of damages awarded. Were we to follow the dissent's rule and
award damages provided in the state wrongful death statute,
there would be three separate measures of damages for the
unconstitutional deprivation of life in this circuit: the damages
permitted by the wrongful death statutes of Alabama, Florida
and Georgia. Under that scenario, it is not inconceivable that
a plaintiff in one state would be awarded substantially more
damages under her state's wrongful death statute than another
plaintiff who happens to live in a state with a different measure
of damages for wrongful death.1
4
1
138 See, e.g., Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1506 (1990); Gilmere v.
City of Atlanta, 864 F.2d 734, 739 (1989); STEINGLASS, supra note 4, § 16.2 at 16-
2 to 16-4 & n.18; Herman, supra note 103, at 1082.
131340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965).
138 Id. at 86.
139 See, e.g., Gilmere, 864 F.2d at 739 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,
268 (1985): "[R]esort to state law ... should not be undertaken before principles
of federal law are exhausted").
14D 864 F.2d 734 (1989).
141 Id. at 739. See also Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489 (1990). The
court in Berry refused to apply a state survival statute supplemented with a state
wrongful death statute to determine damages in a § 1983 case in which death
occurred. The court expressed concern that borrowing the state policies would
"place into the hands of the state the decision as to allocation of the recovery in
a § 1983 case, and, indeed, whether there can be any recovery at all." Id. at 1506.
The court also noted that using state law "permits the state to define the scope
and extent of recovery." Id. The court in Berry ultimately concluded "that the
federal courts must fashion a federal remedy to be applied to § 1983 death cases."
Id.
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The Supreme Court has not clearly indicated what role, if any, state
law may play in § 1983 actions.14 2 This has left the door open for courts
to continue to apply state substantive law to some aspects of damages in
§ 1983 cases. For example, in Grandstaff v. City of Borger,143 the Fifth
Circuit applied the substantive law of Texas to determine the damages
recoverable by a § 1983 plaintiff for wrongful death,144 with the impli-
cation that § 1988 determines the choice of law governing damages for
§ 1983.145 There does appear to be some need for Supreme Court clarifi-
cation in this area. But in spite of the approach employed by the Fifth
Circuit, a majority of the other circuit courts of appeals agree that dam-
ages under § 1983 are to be governed by federal common law, and that
the concern for nationwide uniformity should prevail with regard to the
substantive aspects of the statute.
46
In relation to the collateral source rule, if courts are to look to state
law for the appropriate rule, uniformity in computation of damages cannot
,41 See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
143 767 F.2d 161 (1985).
'" There is some difficulty analogizing from a wrongful death suit to other
damage determinations under § 1983. Wrongful death actions present some
unique choice of law problems because the choice of law issues involve more than
just damage questions. Unresolved issues remain as to the availability of § 1983
as a wrongful death remedy. Wrongful death actions thus force the court to
determine the availability of § 1983 as a wrongful death remedy in addition to
determining damage issues. Courts have not agreed on either of these issues.
Compare Berry, 900 F.2d 1489 (utilizing § 1988 to find that federal law is deficient
with regard to wrongful killings, that state law in this area is inconsistent with
federal interests in some instances, and that therefore, a federal remedy must be
created) with Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961) (applying § 1988 to
utilize state wrongful death and survival statutes as a remedy for wrongful killing
in civil rights litigation). See also Steinglass, supra note 2 at 618-23.
14, The court in Grandstaff, without discussion, looked directly to Texas law to
determine damages recoverable for wrongful death under § 1983. Grandstaff, 767
F.2d at 172. The court simply cited Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961),
a case in which state law was applied via § 1988 to determine survival of a §
1983 action, as support for its choice of state law. In a later decision, Deselma v.
City of Dallas, 770 F.2d 1334, 1337 n.5 (5th Cir. 1985), the court characterized
Grandstaff as implying that § 1988 determines choice of law for damages under
§ 1983.
146 See, e.g., Figueroa-Rodriguez v. Aquino, 863 F.2d 1037, 1045 (1st Cir. 1988)
(holding that "the measure of damages in section 1983 actions is a matter of
federal common law"); Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509,578 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding
that "federal, not State, common law governs the determination of damages in §
1983 actions"); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d Cir. 1965) (finding the appli-
cation of federal common law necessary for uniformity).
Nationwide uniformity is not necessarily more favorable to the plaintiff. Ins-
istance on uniformity may preclude courts from applying state law more favorable
to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 864 F.2d 734 (1989) (upholding
the trial court's use of federal common law to measure damages for wrongful
death even though application of state law would have resulted in a much greater
award for the plaintiff); Herman, supra note 103, at 1079 n.98 (citing Monessen
Southwestern R.R. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330 (1988), an FELA case with the same
type of result as that in Gilmere).
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exist. The growing divergence of state statutory collateral source rules
and the common law rule will preclude such uniformity. The inference
to be drawn from the more recent Supreme Court cases addressing damage
issues under § 1983 and the majority opinion of the circuit courts is that
there is no role for state law to play in relation to the collateral source
rule. Thus, it would appear that federal courts should apply a federal
common law collateral source rule to damage determinations in § 1983
actions.
Even applying the three-step § 1988 analysis results in the same con-
clusion. 147 Under the more recent Supreme Court applications of § 1988,
the first step is to determine if federal law on the collateral source rule
is deficient or inapplicable. 148 Considering the apparently broad reading
given to federal law in these recent cases, 149 it is difficult to see how that
law is deficient with regard to the collateral source rule. A federal col-
lateral source rule does appear to exist in the context of § 1983 litigation 150
and in actions brought under other federal causes of action.
B. Application of the Collateral Source Rule to Other
Federal Causes of Action
Although the rule in its federal common law form has been applied in
only a few § 1983 cases involving a limited variety of benefits,"' the
collateral source rule has been more fully developed in other federal
causes of actions. An overview of collateral source rule application in
other federal causes of action will indicate the extent to which a federal
common law collateral source rule has been developed in these areas, and
may yield some method of determining how the rule should be applied
in § 1983 litigation.
The United States Supreme Court has addressed a number of damage
issues in the context of § 1983 litigation, 152 but has not directly addressed
the collateral source rule as it relates to § 1983. The Court has, however,
upheld application of the federal common law collateral source rule in
litigation based on other federal causes of action.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Gullett Gin Co., 53 the Supreme
Court held unemployment compensation benefits to be collateral, and
that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion by applying the collateral
source rule and refusing to reduce a backpay award by the amount of
plaintifms benefits. The Court reasoned:
147 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
141 See, e.g., Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984).
,41 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
,51 See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
13 340 U.S. 361 (1951).
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To decline to deduct state unemployment compensation benefits
in computing back pay is not to make the employees more whole
as contended by respondent. Since no consideration has been
given to collateral losses in framing an order to reimburse
employees for their lost earnings, manifestly no consideration
need be given to collateral benefits which employees may have
received. 1
54
In addition, the Court rejected the defendant's contention that the ben-
efits were identified with the defendant, holding that unemployment com-
pensation benefits are collateral even though the employer had paid into
the fund through taxation. The court based its ruling on the fact that
"the payments to the employees were not made to discharge any liability
or obligation of respondent, but to carry out a policy of social betterment
for the benefit of the entire state."'' 5 The Court also noted that the state
would be allowed to recoup the unemployment compensation benefits from
the plaintiff.
Applying the collateral source rule to disability pension benefits in a
claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 156 the Supreme
Court in Eichel v. New York Central Railroad'17 held that evidence of
such benefits was not admissible to indicate a motive for not returning
to work since the evidence might be misused by a jury on the issue of
damages. The Court stated, "[ilt has long been recognized that evidence
showing that the defendant is insured creates a substantial likelihood of
misuse [by a jury]. Similarly, we must recognize that the petitioner's
receipt of collateral social insurance benefits involves a substantial like-
lihood of prejudicial impact."' 8
Under the guidance of these Supreme Court decisions, federal courts
have applied the collateral source rule to a number of different benefits
in civil rights actions analogous to § 1983. Finding the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Gullett Gin particularly persuasive, federal courts have used
the rule to prevent reduction of damage awards by unemployment com-
pensation in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,159 the Age Discrim-
154 Id. at 364 (emphasis in original).
155 Id.
1,1 The Federal Employers' Liability Acts are codified as 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
157 375 U.S. 253 (1963).
158 Id. at 255.
59 See Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986). Section
1981 guarantees that all persons will have equal rights under the law. For a
general historical analysis and modern interpretation of § 1981, see Barry L.
Refsin, Comment, The Lost Clauses of Section 1981: A Source of Greater Protection
After Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1209 (1990).
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ination in Employment Act (ADEA),'5 ° and Title VII.161 Social Security
and disability benefits have been held to be collateral in ADEA, FELA,
and Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) cases. 162 In one FTCA case, the
court held that medicare benefits could not be used to reduce a damage
award.6 3 Welfare benefits were also considered as collateral recovery in
a § 1981 action.'M Even vacation allowances have been ruled to be a
collateral benefit in an ADEA action. 16 5
Other courts have been hesitant in extending the Supreme Court
decisions to other areas.'r Due to the fact that many circuits hold that
the application of the collateral source rule, along with most damage
determination decisions, is within the discretion of the trial court,1 7 most
of the circuit court decisions which decline to extend the application of
the collateral source rule involve upholding a trial court's discretion in
its application of the rule. 68
Although a majority of circuits still hold that application of the col-
lateral source rule is within the discretion of the trial court, an increasing
number of circuits are eliminating the trial court's discretion and instead
requiring the collateral source rule to be brought into play to preclude
'- 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988) (Federal Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967). See, e.g., Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544 (10th
Cir. 1988); E.E.O.C. v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980); Marshall v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1977). For general information
concerning ADEA cases, see Yvonne T. Kuczynski, Note, Administrative Res
Judicata and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1111
(1989).
1-1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964). See, e.g., Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1983); Catlett
v. Missouri State Highway Comm'n, 627 F. Supp. 1015 (W.D. Mo. 1985). Title VII
is the section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibits discrimination in the
workplace.
162 See, e.g., Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1985) (ADEA);
Sheehy v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 631 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1980) (FELA);
Smith v. United States, 587 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1978) (FTCA); United States v.
Harue Hayashi, 282 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1960) (FTCA). The Federal Tort Claims
Act has been codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988).
1- Berg v. United States, 806 F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1986).
1- Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986).
161 E.E.O.C. v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980).
1 See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, 542 F.2d 579, 591-92
(2d Cir. 1976) (finding the Supreme Court's reasoning in NLRB v. Gullett Gin
Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951), inapplicable to a Title VII action).
167 See, e.g., Perry v. Larson, 794 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1986). "Most circuits in-
cluding our own hold that the decision whether to deduct is within the discretion
of the district court." Id. at 286 n.3.
- See, e.g., Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that district court's deduction of unemployment compensation benefits
and retirement pension benefits was a matter within the discretion of the district
court in an ADEA action); E.E.O.C. v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, 542 F.2d
579 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to
deduct public assistance benefits from a backpay award in a Title VII case); Bowe
v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that deduction of
unemployment compensation benefits was proper as a valid exercise of the trial
court's discretion in a Title VII case).
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deductions for some benefits in certain causes of action. For example, the
Third, Fourth, Ninth and Eleventh circuits have held that unemployment
compensation benefits may not be deducted from backpay awards in Title
VII actions. 169 Part of the reasoning behind these decisions appears to be
a desire for uniformity. The Seventh Circuit also seems to be moving in
this direction. In Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,'70 the appellate court
upheld the district court's use of the collateral source rule to refuse to
deduct unemployment compensation and welfare benefits from the plain-
tiff's backpay award in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court
concluded that "this circuit's rule, which allows the district judge in his
discretion to deduct or not deduct unemployment benefits in Title VII
cases (and, we may assume, substantively similar section 1981 cases),
may be unduly favorable to defendants.' 171 The court also noted:
Our decisions allowing the [discretionary] deduction of un-
employment benefits in Title VII cases may ... have been un-
dermined by our recent holding that the collateral-benefits rule
forbids a deduction for unemployment benefits in a civil rights
damage suit. Perry v. Larson, 794 F.2d 279, 285-86 (7th Cir.
1986). Perry was a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the present
case is under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but it is not obvious why that
should make a difference.
1 72
There is some difficulty analogizing from other federal causes of action
to § 1983. The difficulty is due in part to differences in legislative purpose
and statutory language. 173 But more importantly, some of the analogous
civil rights cases differ from § 1983 actions in their use of state law. In
169 See Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1983); Brown v. A.J.
Gerrard Mfg. Co., 715 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1983); Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp.,
695 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1982); E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183 (4th Cir.
1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 219 (1982) (decision not disturbed with respect to collateral
source rule holding). While purporting to eliminate discretion on the part of the
trial court, the Third Circuit has not taken an absolute approach to deduction of
unemployment compensation. In Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998 (3d Cir. 1984), the
court sidestepped the Pennsylvania legislature by taking a novel approach to
damage award reduction in a Title VII suit. The defendant in the case was a
state juvenile detention facility operated by the Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare. The court distinguished Craig, 721 F.2d 77, and held that un-
employment compensation and public assistance benefits should be deducted from
the damage award. Id. at 1006-07. The court reasoned that even though a Penn-
sylvania statute provided for recoupment of those benefits in a backpay award
situation, it would be a waste of taxpayers' money to make the state sue for
recoupment when award reduction would accomplish the same objective. Id. at
1007.
170 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986).
171 Id. at 1429.
1
72 Id. at 1428-29.
"I These differences are apparent when comparing FELA cases and § 1983
actions with regard to choice of law. For an analysis of the differences between
FELA and § 1983 with focus on choice of law issues, see Herman, supra note 103,
at 1104-09.
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this regard, FTCA cases are probably the least analogous since under
that Act, damages in general are determined by state law, 7 4 and the
collateral source rule, in particular, has been held to be governed by state
law.175 On the opposite end of the spectrum, Title VII and ADEA damage
decisions, including application of the collateral source rule, are deter-
mined according to federal common law, with no reference to state law.
176
Section 1981 litigation, however, is identical to § 1983 litigation with
regard to choice of law since § 1981 is another of the post-Civil War
Federal Civil Rights Acts.17 v Thus, cases under § 1981 may apply directly
to solving the problem regarding the collateral source rule in § 1983
actions. It may be significant, for example, that the Seventh Circuit in
Hunter1v7 chose to base its decision regarding the application of the col-
lateral source rule in a § 1981 case on federal common law, rather than
turning to the law of the forum state.
Choice of law under § 1983 falls somewhere between the extremes of
looking solely to federal common law and extensive borrowing of appro-
priate state law. For instance, the Supreme Court has held that statutes
of limitations 79 and survival actions 80 under § 1983 are governed by
state law, but immunities""' and availability of damages 1 2 are to be de-
termined by federal common law.18 3 Since § 1983 appears to be somewhat
of a hybrid as to choice of law, examination of analogous causes of action
provides only limited guidance. What can be drawn from the other civil
rights cases though, is that the federal common law collateral source rule
is quite well-developed in the general area of federal civil rights litigation,
in spite of the limited opportunities courts have had to deal with it.
Applying the federal common law collateral source rule in § 1983 cases,
courts have held that public assistance benefits and unemployment com-
pensation payments are from collateral sources and may not be used to
reduce damage awards.8 4 In a § 1981 case, the court looked to federal
common law to determine that welfare payments constituted a collateral
174 See 35 AM. JuR. 2D Federal Tort Claims Act § 103 (1967 & Supp. 1990).
175 See Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1964). "[B]efore the col-
lateral source doctrine will be applied in a Federal Tort Claims Act case, it must
appear that the law of the state in which the wrong occurred would apply the
doctrine." 35 AM. JUR. 2D Federal Tort Claims Act § 110 (1967).
17 ADEA and Tile VII cases require use of federal common law partly for
manageability reasons. Since both may involve multi-state employers and class
action suits, it would be virtually impossible to sort out the relationship between
various state laws and various parties.
177 The surviving provisions of the first Federal Civil Rights Act are now codified
in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (1988).
178 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986).
179 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Burnettv. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984).
180 Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
18, Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
18l See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (availability of punitive damages);
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (definition of compensatory damages and
availability of nominal damages).
"'1 See also Herman, supra note 103, at 1079.
18 See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
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benefit. 185 A court dealing with welfare payments in a § 1983 suit should
reach the same result. Exactly what approach courts entertaining § 1983
actions will take with regard to other types of benefits is not entirely
clear. Assuming that federal courts must apply the federal common law
collateral source rule, and given the Supreme Court's fairly broad defi-
nition of federal law in § 1983 litigation, courts may analogize to Title
VII, ADEA and FELA actions for application of the federal common law
collateral source rule. Analogizing to these other civil rights actions for
federal common law is reasonable and would provide a method of dealing
with a number of benefits which have not yet been questioned in § 1983
litigation. In addition, the reasoning applied in Title VII, ADEA and
FELA cases could reveal a method of analysis that federal courts could
apply to new types of benefits issues which are not likely to arise in other
federal civil rights litigation.186
C. The Federal Common Law Collateral Source Rule in State
Courts Entertaining Section 1983 Actions
Even if there is a sufficiently developed body of federal common law to
govern the collateral source rule in § 1983 actions brought in federal
courts, an additional question exists as to whether state courts enter-
taining § 1983 actions may continue to look to the law of their state to
resolve this damage issue. Most state courts have, on "first generation"
damage issues, followed federal common law.18 7 In addition, commenta-
tors on this question agree that "state courts must follow the 'substance'
of section 1983,"'18 but may apply state procedural rules. Although it may
I85 See Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986). See also
supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
181 Some of these benefits, such as medicare and private medical insurance
benefits, seem to arise more frequently as issues in FTCA cases. Courts enter-
taining § 1983 actions cannot analogize to FTCA actions, however, since state,
rather than federal law is applied to damage determinations in FTCA suits. See
supra note 175 and accompanying text.
187 See STEINGLASS, supra note 4, § 16.3 at 16-5 to 16-6 & n.26. See also Brody
v. Leamy, 393 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (holding that damages recoverable
under Section 1983 are governed by federal common law); Rogers v. Saylor, 746
P.2d 718 (Or. Ct. App. 1987) (noting the development of federal common law
relating to damages for § 1983 claims); Orr v. Crowder, 315 S.E.2d 593 (W. Va.
1984) (noting the existence of a federal common law of damages in § 1983 liti-
gation, but applying the state collateral source rule); Barnhill v. Board of Regents
of UW System, 462 N.W.2d 249 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that punitive damage
awards under § 1983 are governed by the federal common law of damages. But
see Boulder Valley School Dist. R-2 v. Price, 805 P.2d 1085 (Colo. 1991) (using §
1988 analysis to apply state law concerning the burden of proof for finding punitive
damages in a § 1983 case); Ricard v. State of Louisiana, 390 So. 2d 882 (La. 1980)
(refusing to apply federal common law which allows punitive damages and holding
that punitive damages are not available in § 1983 actions brought in Louisiana
state courts).
I'l See, e.g., Herman, supra note 103, at 1060-61.
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be difficult in some instances to determine whether a particular rule is
substantive or procedural,8 9 that is not the case with the collateral source
rule. This rule of damages can directly affect the size of damage awards,
and thus is a part of substantive common law of damages. Since the
collateral source rule has been applied to § 1983 actions in a federal
common law form, that rule should also apply to § 1983 suits heard in
state courts to help effect the uniformity of substance which is desirable
in civil rights litigation. In addition, allowing state courts to refuse to
apply the federal common law collateral source rule to § 1983 actions
could increase forum shopping. The disadvantages to plaintiffs in states
like Ohio, which has enacted collateral source rule reform legislation
arguably applicable to § 1983 litigation, could strongly influence the
choice of a federal forum over a state one.
190
V. CONCLUSION
The fact that there is no direct Supreme Court guidance or clear circuit
court consensus on the appropriate collateral source rule to apply to dam-
age determinations in § 1983 actions has resulted in some lack of uni-
formity in § 1983 damage awards. While uniformity in all aspects of
§ 1983 litigation has never been of overriding importance in relation to
damage determination issues such as the collateral source rule, uniform-
ity should be a primary consideration because of the way in which dam-
ages aid in defining the rights involved in § 1983 actions. If courts may
continue to look to state law for the appropriate rule, this lack of uni-
formity in a substantive area of § 1983 may increase as additional states
enact statutes altering the common law collateral source rule. The re-
sulting differences in the relief afforded to § 1983 plaintiffs in various
forums argues strongly against allowing the application of state collateral
source rules to damage awards. The remedy provided by § 1983 must be
the same for all persons whose constitutional rights have been violated,
regardless of the state in which the suit is brought.
Opponents of the collateral source rule may have the better argument;
they have, after all, convinced a good number of state legislatures to alter
a common law rule which has been firmly established for over a century.
189 See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
See generally STEINGLASS, supra note 4, § 10.1 at 16-1 (noting that state
court "reliance on state policies in § 1983 litigation may deny plaintiff a forum
that can reach the merits of their federal claims and provide full relief," thus
forcing potential state court litigants to choose a federal forum). See also Felder
v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (expressing a concern for creating a situation con-
ducive to forum shopping by reasoning in part that use of state notice of claim
statutes would produce different outcomes depending only on whether the suit
was brought in state or federal court). The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision
in Ricard v. State of Louisiana, 390 So. 2d 882 (La. 1980), which held that punitive
damages are not available in § 1983 actions brought in Louisiana courts, is a
good example of forcing certain litigants to shop for the best forum. If a plaintiff
in Louisiana wishes to pursue punitive damages under § 1983, he must bring the
action in federal district court or lose the possibility of recovering those damages.
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Perhaps the federal rule should also be modified or abolished altogether. 1 91
At present, however, the common law collateral source rule is most def-
initely an established part of federal common law and as such, should
apply uniformly to civil rights actions such as § 1983. If the rule needs
to be changed in the federal context, it should be judicially altered or
statutorily modified by Congress, not changed in a piecemeal and incon-
sistent manner through application of widely varying state rules.
LINDA L. HousE
"' A majority of commentators would opt for complete abrogation of the col-
lateral source rule. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 10; Fleming, supra note 8; William
Schwartz, The Collateral Source Rule, 41 B.U.L. REv. 348 (1961); see also Kenneth
S. Abraham, What is a Tort Claim? An Interpretation of Contemporary Tort Re-
form, 51 MD. L. REV. 172, 190-96 (1992) (interpreting legislative alteration of the
collateral source rule as a positive move toward a more equitable compensation
system in tort law). But see Branton, supra note 8 (arguing that a truly objective
perspective requires retention of the rule in the interests of equity).
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